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I. Introduction 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)1 gives 
employees the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”2 When President Roosevelt signed the Act into law in 
1935, few could have imagined the new contexts in which 
“concerted activities” would arise. The Act’s drafters envisioned a 
workplace in which employees communicated with each other in 
person. Employee communication is no longer so limited, 
however. Facebook and other social networking websites have 
altered this traditional water cooler model, creating new spaces 
in which employees interact. 
With these new spaces come new questions. Chief among 
them is how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
Board)3 should apply the Act’s concerted activity provision in 
                                                                                                     
 1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)). The Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act in NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 3. The Board is an independent agency created by the NLRA. Id. § 153; 
see also NLRB, Who We Are, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 
27, 2012) (“The National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal 
agency that protects the rights of private sector employees to join together, with 
or without a union, to improve their wages and working conditions.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). When this Note refers to the Board 
in Part I and Parts III–VI, it is referring to the agency as a whole. It is not 
referring to the five-member, quasi-judicial body within the agency, unless 
THE VIRTUAL WATER COOLER 1717 
cases involving a virtual water cooler. Do existing standards for 
defining concerted activity make sense when applied in the social 
media context, or should the NLRB alter them to better comport 
with the realities of contemporary interaction? Facebook firing 
cases—cases in which an employer fires an employee because of a 
Facebook posting—provide insight. 
Adapting the present concerted activity standard for 
application in Facebook firing cases has presented the Board with 
numerous challenges. The source of these challenges is the very 
nature of social media; the forum itself makes it more difficult to 
distinguish reasonably between activity that is concerted and 
activity that is not. Furthermore, the forum alters the calculus of 
interest balancing in which the Board must engage to effectuate 
the Act’s purposes. While the Board has attempted to clarify how 
social media will fit into existing doctrine, uncertainty remains. 
This Note examines why uncertainty remains and offers 
three temporally based approaches to remedy the uncertainty. 
Part II of this Note explores the Board’s present interpretation of 
concerted activity. Part III details how entities within the Board 
have applied the standard in Facebook firing cases. Part IV 
examines why the application of the standard in Facebook firing 
cases is problematic. Part V suggests three approaches that the 
Board should consider: promulgating a model social media policy; 
identifying factors that tend to indicate concertedness in the 
social media context; and applying a more stringent loss-of-
protection standard to cases involving social media. These 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and recognize both the 
unique attributes of the social media context and the interests 
that the context implicates. 
II. The Development of the Present Concerted Activity Standard  
A. The Statutory Language 
As is often the case, the heart of the issue lies in the 
ambiguity of statutory language. Section 7 of the NLRA states: 
                                                                                                     
otherwise indicated. See NLRB, The Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (describing the five-member board) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”4 In the list of employee rights, 
the right “to engage in other concerted activities” provides the 
most room for interpretation and, consequently, confusion. This 
confusion is problematic because understanding what constitutes 
concerted activity is a precondition for employees and employers 
to understand the scope of their rights and obligations.5 
Section 7’s language and the placement of the concerted 
activity phrase within the Section provide some insight into the 
meaning of concerted activity. First, the use of “other” in the 
phrase “and to engage in other concerted activities” suggests that 
the activities enumerated before the phrase—self-organizing; 
forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations; and bargaining 
collectively through representatives—are themselves examples of 
concerted activities.6 Second, it appears that Congress intended 
for some unenumerated activities to fall within Section 7. 
Otherwise, the phrase would be unnecessary. Thus, Section 7’s 
language and structure indicate that the activities fitting within 
the phrase’s scope are similar to, yet different from, those 
activities that Congress enumerated specifically. Because neither 
Section 7, nor its legislative history, defines concerted activity 
explicitly,7 the Board has interpreted the Section and divined its 
own definition, while keeping in mind the Act’s purposes.8 
                                                                                                     
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added). Section 7 of the NLRA corresponds 
to 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 5. Section 8 of the NLRA makes the rights set out in Section 7 
enforceable: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 157 . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8 of the NLRA corresponds to 29 
U.S.C. § 158. 
 6. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 n.8 (1984) 
(“Section 7 lists . . . activities initially and concludes the list with the phrase 
‘other concerted activities,’ thereby indicating that the enumerated activities are 
deemed to be ‘concerted.’”). 
 7. See id. at 830 (stating that the Act does not define concerted activity); 
see also Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493 (1984) (stating 
that the Act’s legislative history does not contain a definition). 
 8. The Act’s purposes are set forth in its preamble and include 
“encouraging . . . collective bargaining and . . . protecting the exercise by 
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B. The Board’s Interpretation of the Statutory Language 
The present definition of concerted activity originates from 
Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I).9 In Meyers I, the Board 
adopted what it described as “the ‘objective’ standard of concerted 
activity.”10 The Board contrasted the objective standard with 
what it deemed the “per se standard of concerted activity,”11 the 
standard the Board employed before Meyers I. The Board 
enunciated the per se standard ten years earlier in Alleluia 
Cushion Co.12 It applied to cases in which “an employee [spoke] 
up and [sought] to enforce statutory provisions relating to 
occupational safety designed for the benefit of all employees.”13 In 
those circumstances, the Board stated: “[I]n the absence of any 
evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we 
will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be 
concerted.”14 Because Alleluia did not require an outward 
manifestation of group involvement or support, the Board later 
characterized this as the per se standard of concerted activity.15   
Meyers I firmly rejected this standard,16 defining concerted 
activity as follows: “[T]o find an employee’s activity to be 
‘concerted,’ we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the 
authority of the other employees, and not solely by and on behalf 
                                                                                                     
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 (2006). 
 9. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). 
 10. Id. at 496. 
 11. See id. at 493–97 (describing both standards of concerted activity).  
 12. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B 999 (1975). 
 13. Id. at 1000. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 495 (1984) (“Under the Alleluia 
analytical framework, the Board questioned whether the purpose of the activity 
was one it wished to protect and . . . deemed the activity ‘concerted,’ without 
regard to its form.”).  
 16. See id. at 496 (“[W]e hold that the concept of concerted activity first 
enunciated in Alleluia does not comport with the principles inherent in Section 
7 of the Act.”). The Board then overruled Alleluia. Id. Rather than enunciating 
an entirely new standard, the Board asserted that it was simply returning to 
the pre-Alleluia standard. Id. at 496–97. 
1720 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2012) 
of the employee himself.”17 Determining whether an activity 
meets this standard requires a highly factual inquiry.18 Applying 
this standard to Meyers I’s facts, the Board found that a truck 
driver was not engaged in concerted activity when he 
(1) complained to his employer and state authorities that his 
truck was unsafe; (2) contacted the Tennessee Public Service 
Commission to arrange a vehicle inspection after getting into an 
accident; and (3) refused to drive the truck after the accident.19 
According to the Board, rather than engaging in concerted 
activity, the employee was acting alone.20 
In Prill v. NLRB,21 the D.C. Circuit addressed Meyers I’s 
definition of concerted activity.22 Although the court 
acknowledged the deference due to the Board,23 it found that “the 
Board act[ed] pursuant to an erroneous view of the law . . . when 
it decided that its new definition of ‘concerted activities’ was 
mandated by the NLRA.”24 In addition, the court found that the 
Board misread some of its own precedent.25 Consequently, the 
court remanded the case, instructing the Board to reconsider its 
Meyers I definition because it rested “on a faulty legal premise 
and [was] without adequate rationale.”26  
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 497. To establish a violation of Section 8 of the NLRA, an 
employee must also show that “the employer knew of the concerted nature of the 
employee’s activity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the 
adverse employment action . . . was motivated by the employee’s protected 
concerted activity.” Id.  
 18. See id. (“[T]he question of whether an employee engaged in concerted 
activity is, at its heart, a factual one . . . .”). 
 19. Id. at 498. 
 20. See id. (“Prill [the employee] acted solely on his own behalf.”). 
 21. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 22. Id. at 948–50. 
 23. See id. at 942 (“The Board has been granted broad authority to construe 
the NLRA in light of its expertise.”). In particular, the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 
Inc., in which the Court stated that the Board’s interpretation of the Act, if 
reasonable, “is entitled to considerable deference.” NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 
Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984). 
 24. Prill, 755 F.2d at 942. Thus, the D.C. Circuit asserted that the Board 
“fail[ed] to exercise the discretion delegated to it by Congress.” Id. 
 25. See id. at 953–56 (challenging the Board’s assertion that the Meyers I 
definition represented a return to the pre-Alleluia definition). 
 26. Id. at 942. The court stressed that it was not suggesting that the 
Meyers I definition was incorrect. See id. (“We express no opinion as to the 
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Nevertheless, in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II),27 the 
Board reaffirmed the Meyers I standard.28 While addressing the 
D.C. Circuit’s concerns, the Board clarified the standard, offering 
more insight into what constitutes concerted activity. First, the 
Board stressed that the standard “requires some linkage to group 
action.”29 Notably, however, the Board emphasized that an 
individual employee’s act can constitute concerted activity.30 
While explaining when individual action falls within Section 7, 
the Board stated: “[O]ur definition of concerted activity in Meyers 
I encompasses those circumstances where individual employees 
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well 
as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the 
attention of management.”31 The Board applied this clarified 
standard to Meyers I’s facts, once again finding that the employee 
did not engage in concerted activity but instead “acted alone and 
without an intent to enlist the support of other employees.”32 
Therefore, the Board affirmed its dismissal of the employee’s 
complaint.33  
III. The Application of the Meyers I Standard in the Social 
Media Context 
The advancement of technology and the growth of employee 
use of technology have presented—and continue to present—
numerous challenges. Technology has required the NLRB to 
                                                                                                     
correct test of ‘concerted activities’ . . . .”). 
 27. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986). 
 28. See id. at 889 (“The Board has reconsidered this case . . . and has 
decided to adhere to the Meyers I definition of concerted activity as a reasonable 
construction of Section 7 of the Act.”). 
 29. Id. at 884. 
 30. See id. at 885 (“There is nothing in the Meyers I definition that states 
that conduct engaged in by a single employee at one point in time can never 
constitute concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7.”).  
 31. Id. at 887. In addition, the Board reaffirmed its so-called “Interboro 
doctrine”: an individual employee who reasonably and honestly invokes a 
collective bargaining right is engaged in concerted activity. Id. at 884–85; see 
also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984) (approving of the 
Interboro doctrine as a reasonable interpretation of the Act). 
 32. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 888. 
 33. Id. at 889. 
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determine how to adapt the NLRA to a modern reality in which 
employee communication is fundamentally different than it was 
seventy-five years ago.34 This adaption process has involved a 
difficult task: attempting to “maintain[] stability in the law while 
simultaneously allowing for flexibility to address these new 
developments.”35 Most recently, social media has presented the 
Board with an opportunity to consider these competing values—
stability and flexibility—for the purpose of balancing the 
competing interests at stake.36 
When confronting new issues, administrative agencies like 
the NLRB have two tools at their disposal: rulemaking and 
adjudication. Because agencies often lack ready answers to the 
questions that emerging issues present, adjudication provides a 
vehicle to explore those issues, formulate an approach, and 
develop a rationale. In SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II),37 the 
Supreme Court characterized this process as a necessary and 
valuable supplement to agencies’ rulemaking authority.38 When 
explaining why an agency could reasonably prefer to address an 
issue through adjudication, the Court stated: “Not every principle 
essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should 
be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some 
principles must await their own development, while others must 
be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations.”39 Thus 
far, the NLRB has chosen to confront the issues presented by 
social media through adjudication. 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor 
Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2000) (“For six and one-half decades, the National Labor 
Relations Board and the courts have been developing and refining doctrine 
under the National Labor Relations Act in the context of traditional physically 
defined workplaces.”). 
 35. Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to 
Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. LAW. 253, 253 (2000). 
 36. See Malin & Perritt, supra note 34, at 62 (“Adapting the NLRA to 
electronic workplaces will continue a process of balancing employee rights to 
engage in concerted activities against employer property and entrepreneurial 
rights.”). 
 37. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 38. See id. at 203 (“There is . . . a very definite place for the case-by-case 
evolution of statutory standards.”). 
 39. Id. at 202. 
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By late 2011, the Board had reviewed approximately 130 
cases involving social media, all existing at varying stages of 
development.40 The Board’s involvement in Facebook firing cases, 
in particular, began on October 27, 2010, when Region 34 of the 
NLRB issued a complaint against a Connecticut ambulance 
company in American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.41 The 
complaint alleged, in part, that a company employee who 
criticized her supervisor on Facebook engaged in concerted 
activity, and that the company terminated her employment 
because of her Facebook postings.42 Because this case, and many 
subsequent cases, settled prior to adjudication,43 guidance on how 
the Board will treat cases involving the intersection of labor law 
and social media is lacking. In addition, guidance is lacking 
because many of these cases have not yet progressed past the 
initial stages of development.44 
                                                                                                     
 40. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE 
THE NLRB (2011), www.uschamber.com/reports/survey-social-media-issues-nlrb 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
This number includes decisions by the five-member board, ALJ decisions, 
settlement agreements, complaints, memoranda, and charges that contain social 
media components. Id. It includes a broader range of factual circumstances than 
is the focus of this Note: concerted activity in the context of Facebook.  
 41. Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576 (Region 34 Oct. 27, 2010), http:// 
documents.jdsupra.com/daf37177-f935-4fe0-be1f-82c65d0f2ac3.pdf. Typically, a 
case proceeds through the following stages: First, the employee or the 
employee’s representative files a charge—“a one-page form alleging that an 
employer or union has committed an unfair labor practice”—with one of the 
Board’s regional offices. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 3. 
Second, the regional office investigates and “makes a determination as to 
whether the charge has merit.” Id. If the regional office finds that the charge 
has merit, it issues a complaint, and the parties either settle the case, or the 
case proceeds to adjudication. Id. The NLRB has thirty-two regional offices. 
NLRB, Regional Offices, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices (last 
visited Sept.27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576, at 3–4. 
 43. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 2; see also Press 
Release, NLRB, Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook 
Comments (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-
involving-discharge-facebook-comments (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“A 
settlement has been reached in a case involving the discharge of a Connecticut 
ambulance service employee for posting negative comments about a supervisor 
on her Facebook page.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 1. 
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Nevertheless, some guidance exists. Of particular importance 
are two reports: one issued by the Board’s Acting General 
Counsel on August 18, 2011 (First NLRB Report or First 
Report)45 and one issued by the Board’s Acting General Counsel 
on January 24, 2012 (Second NLRB Report or Second Report).46 
The First Report “presents recent case developments arising in 
the context of today’s social media,” including “issues concerning 
the protected and/or concerted nature of employees’ Facebook and 
Twitter postings.”47 After the Acting General Counsel issued the 
First Report, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)48 heard the first 
three Facebook firing cases: Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,49 
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.,50 and Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille.51 
                                                                                                     
 45. NLRB OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT 
OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) 
[hereinafter FIRST NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operations-
management-memos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The First NLRB Report does not contain page numbers, 
so they have been assigned: the first page is number one and the last page is 
number twenty-four. See also NLRB, The General Counsel, http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
who-we-are/general-counsel (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“The General Counsel, 
appointed by the President to a 4-year term, is independent from the [five-
member board] and is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of unfair 
labor practice cases and for the general supervision of the NLRB field offices in 
the processing of cases.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. NLRB OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT 
OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) 
[hereinafter SECOND NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operations-
management-memos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 47. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 2. 
 48. ALJs are Article I judges who are similar to “trial court judges hearing 
a case without a jury.” NLRB, Administrative Law Judge Decisions, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/administrative-law-judge-
decisions (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). After a regional office issues a complaint, an ALJ “hears the case and 
issues a decision and recommendation order.” Id. 
 49. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 
3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). See infra Part III.C.1. 
 50. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 
(Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011). See infra Part III.C.2. 
 51. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 
76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). See infra Part III.C.3. Although the 
respondent in this case is Three D, LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 
this Note will refer to the case as “Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille” or “Triple 
Play” because it is commonly referred to by those names. 
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Following these cases, the Acting General Counsel issued the 
Second Report, which discusses cases containing “emerging 
issues in the context of social media.”52 These two reports, along 
with the ALJ cases, provide insight into how the Board will treat 
future Facebook firing cases.53 
A. The First NLRB Report 
The First NLRB Report contains summaries of fourteen cases 
involving social media, nine of which pertain to the concerted 
nature of online postings.54 In addition, the First Report discusses 
whether the General Counsel’s Division of Advice (Division of 
Advice) found each case meritorious.55 Its purpose, as stated by 
                                                                                                     
 52. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 2. 
 53. On May 30, 2012, the Acting General Counsel issued a third report 
(Third NLRB Report or Third Report) discussing social media cases. See NLRB 
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) [hereinafter THIRD 
NLRB REPORT], www.nlrb.gov/publications/operations-management-memos (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Unlike the first two reports, the Third NLRB Report focuses solely on social 
media policies and rules. Id. at 2. Although this Note touches on the Board’s role 
in providing guidance in this area, the Board’s analysis of social media policies 
and rules is not the focus of this Note. See Part V.A (discussing the connection 
between providing guidance in the area of social media policies and rules and 
solving the concerted activity problem). Thus, this Note does not discuss the 
Third Report in-depth. 
 54. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar & 
Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915 (Div. of Advice); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452 (Div. of Advice); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872 (Div. of Advice); Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-
12950, 2011 WL 3223853 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011); Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 
17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011); JT’s Porch 
Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (Div. of 
Advice July 7, 2011); Rural Metro, N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970 
(Div. of Advice June 29, 2011); Lee Enters., Inc. N.L.R.B. No. 28-CA-23267 (Div. 
of Advice Apr. 21, 2011); Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-
12576 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010)). One of the nine cases—Lee Enterprises, 
Inc.—involves the concerted nature of Twitter postings and is included in the 
discussion because it implicates similar issues. The five other cases involve 
matters beyond the scope of this Note. Furthermore, the First Report does not 
identify explicitly the cases that it discusses. This was determined 
independently.  
 55. Id. The First Report states that the cases it discusses “were decided 
upon a request for advice from a Regional Director.” Id. at 2. When a regional 
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the Board’s Acting General Counsel, Lafe Solomon, is to 
“encourage compliance with the Act and cooperation with Agency 
personnel” by “keep[ing] the labor-management community fully 
aware of the activities of [his] office.”56  
1. When Concerted Activity Was Present  
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity existed 
in four of the nine cases. Three of these four cases—Hispanics 
United, Karl Knauz Motors, and Triple Play—went on to become 
the first Facebook firing cases heard by an ALJ.57 The other 
case—American Medical—settled.58 Thus, the First Report and 
the Advice Memorandum it summarizes contain the only existing 
analysis of American Medical. 
In American Medical, the Division of Advice found that an 
employee engaged in concerted activity when she posted negative 
comments about her supervisor on her Facebook page.59 The 
employee posted the comments after her employer denied her 
request for a union representative to assist her in the preparation 
of a written incident report.60 Coworkers responded to the 
postings, and eventually the employee was terminated.61 Because 
the employee “discuss[ed] supervisory actions with coworkers in 
her Facebook post,”62 the Division of Advice found that her 
activity was both protected and concerted.63  
                                                                                                     
office receives a charge, it may request advice from the Division of Advice if the 
charge presents a difficult or novel legal issue. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
supra note 40, at 4. The Division of Advice prepares Advice Memoranda, which 
“evaluate the facts of particular cases and advise the regional office where the 
charge originated whether it should issue a complaint.” Id. 
 56. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 2. 
 57. See infra Part III.C.1–3. 
 58. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 43 (discussing the settlement). 
 59. FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 5–6 (citing Am. Med. Response 
of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010)). For 
example, she called her supervisor a “scumbag.” Id. at 5. 
 60. Id. The incident report concerned a customer complaint. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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2. When Concerted Activity Was Not Present 
The Division of Advice found that there was no concerted 
activity in five of the nine cases. For example, in Lee Enterprises, 
Inc.,64 the Division of Advice found that an employee’s Twitter 
postings did not constitute concerted activity.65 The case involved 
a newspaper reporter who created a Twitter account after his 
employer, a newspaper company, encouraged him to do so.66 After 
creating the account, he posted tweets criticizing his copy editors 
and a local television station.67 In addition, he posted tweets 
concerning local homicides and others containing sexual 
content.68 In finding that his eventual termination did not violate 
the Act, the Division of Advice stated that the employee’s 
“conduct was not protected and concerted: it did not relate to the 
terms and conditions of his employment or seek to involve other 
employees in issues related to employment.”69 
Likewise, in JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd.,70 the Division 
of Advice found that an employee’s Facebook posting did not 
constitute concerted activity.71 In response to a question posed by 
his stepsister, the employee, a bartender, expressed frustration 
with his employer’s tipping policy.72 Although the employee had 
previously discussed his concerns about the tipping policy with a 
coworker, the Division of Advice found that the posting was not 
concerted because the employee “did not discuss the posting with 
his coworkers, and none of them responded to the posting.”73 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 12–14 (citing Lee Enters., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 28-CA-23267 (Div. of 
Advice Apr. 21, 2011)).  
 65. Id. at 13. 
 66. See id. at 12 (“[T]he [e]mployer encouraged employees . . . to use social 
media to get news stories out . . . .”). 
 67. Id. at 12–13. 
 68. Id. at 13. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 14–15 (citing JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13-
CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (Div. of Advice July 7, 2011)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 14. The employee’s sister responded in agreement, saying that 
the policy “sucked.” Id. 
 73. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).  
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In Rural Metro,74 the Division of Advice found that a person’s 
Facebook posting on a United States Senator’s Facebook page did 
not constitute concerted activity.75 After the Senator made a 
Facebook posting concerning federal grants to fire departments, 
the person, who worked for a company that contracted with fire 
departments, responded by complaining about her wages and the 
way that the state handled emergency medical services.76 
Although the employee “had discussed wages with other 
employees after [her] [e]mployer had announced a wage cap,” the 
Division of Advice found that the posting was not concerted, 
emphasizing the fact that “she did not discuss her posting with 
any other employee.”77 
In Martin House,78 the Division of Advice found that an 
employee of a nonprofit facility for homeless people was not 
engaged in concerted activity when she posted comments about 
the facility’s mentally disabled clients on her Facebook page.79 
Because the employee “did not discuss her Facebook posts with 
any of her fellow employees” and “none of her coworkers 
responded to the posts,” the activity was not concerted.80 
Finally, in Wal-Mart,81 the Division of Advice found that a 
Wal-Mart employee who posted comments critical of the store’s 
management was not engaged in concerted activity, even though 
several coworkers responded to the postings.82 The Division of 
Advice emphasized that the postings were “expression[s] of an 
individual gripe.”83 The coworkers’ responses did not make the 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 15–16 (citing Rural Metro, N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 
2960970 (Div. of Advice June 29, 2011)). 
 75. Id. at 16. 
 76. Id. at 15. 
 77. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 16–17 (citing Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 
3223853 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011)). 
 79. Id. For example, the employee “stated that it was spooky being alone 
overnight in a mental institution, that one client was cracking her up, and that 
[she] did not know whether the client was laughing at her, with her, or at the 
client’s own voices.” Id. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 17–18 (citing Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 
3223852 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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Facebook activity concerted because the responses “merely 
indicated that [the coworkers] had found the employee’s first 
posting humorous, asked why the employee was so ‘wound up,’ or 
offered emotional support.”84 
3. What the Cases in the First Report Tell Us 
Although the General Counsel did not identify explicitly the 
factors that the Division of Advice considered when evaluating 
concertedness in the social media context, the Division of Advice 
considered certain factors regularly in its analysis. Such factors 
include: (1) whether the posting grew out of prior non-Facebook 
group activity,85 (2) whether the posting contemplated future non-
Facebook group activity,86 (3) whether coworkers responded to 
the posting,87 (4) whether the employee who made the posting 
discussed the posting itself with coworkers,88 (5) the intent of the 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. See Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 
(Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (“[H]er activity was not an outgrowth of the 
employees’ collective concerns.”); Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 
WL 3223852, at *2 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (finding no “evidence that 
establishes that the Charging Party’s postings were the logical outgrowth of 
prior group activity”); JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-
46689, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (Div. of Advice July 7, 2011) (“[T]his internet 
‘conversation’ did not grow out [of] his prior conversation with a fellow 
bartender months earlier about the tipping policy.”). 
 86. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“[T]he Charging Party was 
not seeking to induce or prepare for group action . . . .”); Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 
3223852, at *2 (“They [the postings] contain no language suggesting the 
Charging Party sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group 
action. . . .”). 
 87. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“[N]one of her coworkers 
responded to the posts.”); JT’s Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (“[N]one of his 
coworkers responded to the posting.”); Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576, at 9 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010) (characterizing the 
Facebook activity as a “discussion” because coworkers responded to the 
employee’s postings). 
 88. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (“The Charging Party did 
not discuss her Facebook posts with any of her fellow employees . . . .”); JT’s 
Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (“[H]e did not discuss his Facebook posting with 
any of his fellow employees either before or after he wrote it . . . .”); Rural Metro, 
N.L.R.B. No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970, at *2 (Div. of Advice June 29, 
2011) (“The Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook posting with any other 
employee . . . either before or immediately thereafter.”).  
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employee who made the posting, as reflected by the language and 
context of the posting,89 and (6) how coworkers interpreted the 
posting, as reflected by their responses.90  
Factors one and two relate closely to the standard developed 
in Meyers I and its progeny: if individual action grows out of prior 
group action or prepares for future group action, it is likely 
concerted.91 One question unique to the social media context is 
whether the Facebook activity in question must be an outgrowth 
of, or preparation for, in-person group activity, or whether it can 
be an outgrowth of, or preparation for, additional online group 
activity. The Division of Advice’s analysis suggests that a lack of 
connection to in-person group activity will weigh against finding 
that Facebook activity is concerted.92 
As factors three and four indicate, the Division of Advice 
focused not only on the original posting and the person who made 
it, but also on whether coworkers became involved in the posting. 
The Division of Advice examined two forms of involvement: 
whether coworkers responded to the posting online and whether 
the posting itself became a topic of in-person conversation.93 
Typically, the Division of Advice focused on the absence of these 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Martin House, 2011 WL 3223853, at *2 (finding the postings 
revealed the employee’s intent to “communicat[e] with her personal friends 
about what was happening on her shift”); Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2 
(finding the postings revealed the employee’s intent to “express . . . his 
frustration regarding his individual dispute with the Assistant Manager”); JT’s 
Porch, 2011 WL 2960964, at *2 (finding the postings revealed the employee’s 
intent to “respond[] to a question from his step-sister about how his evening at 
work went”); Rural Metro, 2011 WL 2960970, at *2 (finding the postings 
revealed the employee’s intent “to make a public official aware of the state of 
emergency medical services in Indiana”).  
 90. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2 (finding that coworkers’ 
responses were reactions to an individual gripe rather than the beginning of 
group action). For example, the Division of Advice characterized a coworker’s 
“‘hang in there’-type comment” as suggesting that the coworker viewed the 
employee’s “postings to be a plea for emotional support.” Id. 
 91. See NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that individual action may be concerted when it is a “‘logical outgrowth’ 
of prior concerted activity”); see also Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986) 
(stating that “individual employees seek[ing] to initiate or to induce or to 
prepare for group action” may be involved in concerted activity). 
 92. See supra notes 85–86. 
 93. See supra notes 87–88. Discussion of a posting can occur within a 
conversation about common concerns, or it can provide a means of entering into 
a conversation about common concerns.  
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factors, which are objective in nature, when finding that 
Facebook activity was not concerted.94 In contrast, when the 
Division of Advice found that Facebook activity was concerted, it 
put less of an emphasis on whether coworkers discussed the 
posting itself with each other in person. Perhaps this is because 
in the cases in which the Division of Advice found concertedness, 
coworkers usually responded to the original posting by making 
postings of their own.95 Thus, their responses reflected knowledge 
of the original posting, and an examination of whether the 
original posting was a topic of in-person conversation became 
unnecessary. Even so, when finding concerted activity, the 
Division of Advice tended to address the significance of coworker 
responses only implicitly—by characterizing the Facebook 
activity as a “discussion” or “conversation” when coworkers 
responded—rather than stating clearly that coworker responses 
indicated concertedness.96  
Factors five and six represent an implicit focus in the 
Division of Advice’s analysis on the subjective intent of those 
involved in the Facebook activity. In each case, the Division of 
Advice analyzed what the person who made the posting was 
“seeking to” or “trying to” do.97 Likewise, it looked at coworkers’ 
responses to discern how they interpreted the posting: whether 
their responses reflected an intent to participate in group action 
or simply conveyed, for example, that they found the posting 
amusing.98  
                                                                                                     
 94. See, e.g., Martin House, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853, 
at *2 (Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (finding that the Facebook activity was not 
concerted in part because “[t]he Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook 
posts with any of her fellow employees, and none of her coworkers responded to 
the posts”). 
 95. See, e.g., Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576, 
at 3–4 (Div. of Advice Oct. 5, 2010) (listing coworker responses). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 9 (characterizing the online activity as a “discussion” of 
supervisory actions). 
 97. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852, at *2 
(Div. of Advice July 19, 2011) (“They [the postings] contain no language 
suggesting the Charging Party sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage 
in group action; rather they express only his frustration regarding his individual 
dispute . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 98. See, e.g., id. (“Employee 1 merely indicated that he found Charging 
Party’s first Facebook posting humorous . . . .”). 
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Although it is possible to identify factors that the Division of 
Advice considered regularly, it is difficult to discern the weight 
that the Division of Advice attributed to each factor. The Division 
of Advice neither attributed a uniform weight to each factor nor 
indicated which factor(s) it considered more heavily than the 
others. 
B. The Second NLRB Report 
Like the First Report, the Second NLRB Report contains 
summaries of cases involving social media, ten of which include a 
discussion of the concerted nature of Facebook postings.99 
Because, as the Board’s Acting General Counsel acknowledged, 
the issues raised by these cases “continue to be a ‘hot topic’ 
among practitioners, human resource professionals, the media, 
and the public,” the Second Report’s purpose is to continue “to 
provide guidance as this area of law develops.”100  
1. When Concerted Activity Was Present 
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity existed 
in five of the ten cases. For example, in Case A,101 the Division of 
Advice found that an employee engaged in concerted activity 
when she posted a status update on her Facebook page about her 
employer.102 The employee made the posting after her employer 
                                                                                                     
 99. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 
N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-36658 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011); Frito-Lay, Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011); Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. 
No. 11-CA-22936 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011); Case A; Case B; Case C; Case D; 
Case E: Case F; Case G). The NLRB does not release all Advice Memoranda to 
the public. See NLRB, Advice Memos http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/advice-
memos (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Two categories of advice memoranda are 
released to the public: memoranda directing dismissal of the charge . . . and 
memoranda in closed cases that . . . are released in the General Counsel’s 
discretion.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Moreover, the 
Second Report does not contain case names. Unless the name of a case discussed 
in the Second Report was found independently, the case was assigned a letter, 
and this Note refers to it by the letter throughout. 
 100. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 2. 
 101. Id. at 3–6 (citing Case A). 
 102. Id. at 5. “Using expletives, she stated the Employer had messed up and 
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transferred her to a less lucrative position.103 Coworkers and 
former coworkers responded, expressing support, anger, and 
frustration, and one former coworker suggested that the 
employees initiate a class action lawsuit against the employer.104 
A few days after making the posting, the employee was 
terminated.105 In supporting its finding of concerted activity, the 
Division of Advice stated: “[T]he Charging Party’s initial 
Facebook statement, and the discussion it generated, . . . clearly 
fell within the Board’s definition of concerted activity, which 
encompasses employee initiation of group action through the 
discussion of complaints with fellow employees.”106 
 In Case B,107 the Division of Advice found that an employee 
was engaged in concerted activity when she posted several 
comments on her Facebook page.108 The employee posted the first 
comment after a company manager made a sexist remark.109 A 
coworker who was with the employee when the manager made 
the remark responded to the posting.110 The employee later made 
a second series of postings after a coworker was fired, and the 
company’s president reprimanded her for getting involved in 
coworkers’ work-related problems.111 Subsequently, the employee 
was terminated—a termination that the Division of Advice 
concluded was due to her “engag[ement] in discussions with her 
coworkers about working conditions.”112 
Similarly, the Division of Advice found that an employee’s 
Facebook activity was concerted in Case C.113 After a coworker 
                                                                                                     
that she was done with being a good employee.” Id. at 3. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 5. A Charging Party is an employee who files a charge against his 
or her employer, alleging that the employer committed an unfair labor practice. 
 107. Id. at 18–20 (citing Case B). 
 108. Id. at 20. 
 109. Id. at 18. The employee sent an email about the remark to her 
supervisor and a human resources assistant but did not receive responses. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 19. 
 112. Id. at 20. The Division of Advice characterized the termination as a 
“‘pre-emptive strike’ because of the [e]mployer’s fear of what those discussions 
might lead to.” Id. 
 113. Id. at 20–22 (citing Case C). 
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was promoted, the employee had separate discussions with two 
other coworkers about her disagreement with the promotion.114 
She made a Facebook posting reflecting her frustration, and three 
coworkers responded in agreement.115 The employer terminated 
the employee who made the posting, along with one of the 
coworkers who responded, and the employer disciplined the two 
other coworkers who responded.116 The activity was concerted, 
the Division of Advice reasoned, because the employee’s posting 
“sparked a collective dialogue that elicited responses from three 
of her coworkers.”117 The Division of Advice noted: “While the 
concerted actions expressed in the posts were of a preliminary 
nature . . . the movement toward concerted action was halted by 
the [e]mployer’s pre-emptive discharge and discipline of all the 
employees involved.”118 
In Case D,119 the Division of Advice found that an employee’s 
Facebook posting constituted concerted activity.120 Before making 
the posting, the employee participated in discussions with 
coworkers about a superior’s negative attitude and brought the 
concern to management’s attention.121 A coworker posted on her 
Facebook page “that there had been so much drama” at work, and 
an online conversation with coworkers ensued.122 The employee—
who was eventually discharged—responded by stating that “she 
hated [her workplace] and couldn’t wait to get out of there” 
because of the negative work environment.123 The Division of 
Advice concluded that the Facebook activity was concerted 
“because it was a continuation of the earlier group action that 
included complaints to management . . . and because it was part 
of a discussion of employees’ shared concerns.”124 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 20. 
 115. Id. at 20–21. 
 116. Id. at 21. 
 117. Id. at 22. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 22–25 (citing Case D). 
 120. Id. at 23. 
 121. Id. at 22. 
 122. Id. at 22–23. 
 123. Id. at 23. 
 124. Id. 
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Finally, in Case E,125 the Division of Advice found that an 
employee’s Facebook postings made during a seven-month period 
constituted concerted activity.126 Tension between the employee, a 
nurse, and his employer, a hospital, arose after “a recently 
discharged hospital employee killed one supervisor and critically 
wounded another.”127 After the incident, the employee criticized 
his employer publicly—by writing letters to a local newspaper, for 
example.128 In addition, the employee made numerous Facebook 
postings that referenced an on-going labor dispute, commented 
negatively on the employer’s management style, and discussed 
management’s mistreatment of employees.129 The postings 
received comments from coworkers expressing support.130 The 
employer disciplined the employee and later discharged him.131 In 
concluding that the postings constituted concerted activity, the 
Division of Advice stated that they “were the logical outgrowth of 
other employees’ collective concerns or were made with or on the 
authority of other employees.”132 
2. When Concerted Activity Was Not Present 
The Division of Advice found that concerted activity was not 
present in the five other cases. In Case F,133 for example, the 
Division of Advice found that an employee’s two Facebook 
postings did not constitute concerted activity.134 After the 
employee’s “supervisor reprimanded her in front of the Regional 
Manager for failing to perform a task that she had never been 
instructed to perform,” she made a Facebook posting “that 
consisted of an expletive and the name of the [e]mployer’s 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 26–30 (citing Case E). 
 126. Id. at 28. 
 127. Id. at 26. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 26–27. 
 130. Id. at 28–29. 
 131. Id. at 26–27. 
 132. Id. at 28. 
 133. Id. at 6–8 (citing Case F). 
 134. Id. at 7. 
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store.”135 One coworker responded by “Liking” the posting.136 
Then, the employee made a second posting stating that her 
“employer did not appreciate its employees,” to which coworkers 
did not respond.137 In the following days, the employee discussed 
the incident with her coworkers, and she was fired.138 In 
concluding that the Facebook activity was not concerted, the 
Division of Advice characterized the postings as “merely an 
expression of an individual gripe.”139 
In Case G,140 the Division of Advice determined that an 
employee did not engage in concerted activity when she “posted 
angry profane comments on her Facebook wall” about her 
coworkers and employer.141 One coworker responded with 
empathy, saying “that she had gone through the same thing.”142 
Subsequently, the employer fired the employee.143 The Division of 
Advice reasoned that the postings were not concerted because 
they “expressed [the employee’s] personal anger with coworkers 
and the [e]mployer, were made solely on her own behalf, and did 
not involve the sharing of common concerns.”144 
Similarly, in Children’s National Medical Center,145 the 
Division of Advice found that two Facebook postings did not 
constitute concerted activity.146 The first posting expressed the 
employee’s frustration with the way that a doctor had treated the 
employee, a respiratory therapist, and the second posting 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 6. 
 136. Id.; see also Facebook, Like, http://www.facebook.com/help/like (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Clicking Like under something you or a friend posts on 
Facebook is an easy way to let someone know that you enjoy it, without leaving 
a comment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 137. SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra note 46, at 6 (citing Case F). 
 138. Id. at 6–7. 
 139. Id. at 7. 
 140. Id. at 11–13 (citing Case G). 
 141. Id. at 11. The employee “had a history of conflict with several 
coworkers.” Id. 
 142. Id. at 12. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. The Division of Advice characterized the postings as “rants” and 
“general profanities.” Id. 
 145. Id. at 30–32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-
36658 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)). 
 146. Id. at 32. 
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expressed the employee’s irritation with a coworker who was 
sucking his teeth at work.147 The Division of Advice’s analysis of 
concertedness was brief because it found that the content of the 
postings was not protected.148 Nevertheless, the Division of 
Advice stated that even if the first posting were protected, it was 
not concerted because it “was merely a personal complaint.”149 
In Buel, Inc.,150 the Division of Advice found that an 
employee’s Facebook activity was not concerted.151 The employee, 
a truck driver, discovered that roads were closed because of the 
weather.152 He attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach his employer’s 
on-call dispatcher and discussed his inability to reach the 
dispatcher with other drivers.153 He also made several Facebook 
postings, commenting on the situation.154 One of the employee’s 
“Facebook friends,” the employer’s operations manager, 
responded critically, and a conversation ensued.155 Following, the 
employer revoked the employee’s “status as a leader operator,” 
and the employee resigned, claiming he was forced to do so.156 
Despite the discussion that the employee had with other drivers 
before posting on Facebook, the Division of Advice found that 
“there [was] insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a 
continuation of any collective concerns.”157 Rather, the employee 
“was simply expressing his own frustration and boredom about his 
inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”158 
Finally, in Frito-Lay, Inc.,159 the Division of Advice found that 
an employee was not engaging in concerted activity when he 
                                                                                                     
 147. Id. at 30–31. 
 148. Id. at 31–32. 
 149. Id. at 32. The Division of Advice characterized the second posting in 
similar terms. Id. at 31–32. 
 150. Id. at 32–34 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA-22936 (Div. of Advice 
July 28, 2011)). 
 151. Id. at 32. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 32–33. 
 156. Id. at 33. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 34–35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882 (Div. of 
Advice Sept. 19, 2011)).  
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posted on Facebook but was “just venting.”160 The employee, who 
was feeling sick, talked to his supervisor about leaving work 
early.161 The supervisor told the employee that he could leave early 
but would forfeit an attendance point.162 Because the employee did 
not want to lose an attendance point, he completed his shift.163 
After his shift, the employee made a Facebook posting, for which 
he was later discharged, “indicating that it was too bad when your 
boss doesn’t care about your health.”164 The Division of Advice 
concluded that the Facebook activity was not concerted; it was not 
an outgrowth of prior group action, did not attempt to initiate 
group action, and did not receive responses from coworkers.165 
3. What the Cases in the Second Report Tell Us 
The factors that the Division of Advice considered regularly in 
its analysis of the First Report’s cases also appeared in its analysis 
of the Second Report’s cases. Frequently, the Division of Advice 
considered: (1) whether the posting grew out of prior non-Facebook 
group activity,166 (2) whether the posting contemplated future non-
Facebook group activity,167 (3) whether coworkers responded to the 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 35. 
 161. Id. at 34. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 35.  
 166. See id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 4 
(Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (finding that the postings were not “an 
outgrowth of prior employee meetings”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 
11-CA-22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“Although he had discussed 
with other drivers the fact that the on-call dispatcher was not reachable, there 
is insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a continuation of any 
collective concerns.”); Id. at 21 (citing Case C) (“[P]rior to her Facebook postings, 
the Charging Party spoke to two coworkers . . . .”); Id. at 23 (citing Case D) 
(describing the postings as “a continuation of . . . earlier group action that 
included employee complaints to management about the Employer’s Operations 
Manager”); Id. at 28 (citing Case E) (describing the postings as a “logical 
outgrowth” of prior concerted activity); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“[T]he post did 
not grow out of a prior discussion . . . with her coworkers.”). 
 167. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-
36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“The Charging Party was not seeking 
to induce or prepare for group action . . . .”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., 
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posting,168 (4) whether the employee who made the posting 
discussed the posting itself with coworkers,169 (5) the intent of the 
employee who made the posting, as reflected by the language and 
context of the posting,170 and (6) how coworkers interpreted the 
posting, as reflected by their responses.171 
Furthermore, the Division of Advice considered an 
additional factor that it did not consider in the cases discussed 
                                                                                                     
N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 3–4 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (same); Id. at 
33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA-22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28, 
2011)) (same); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“[T]he post contained no language 
suggesting that she sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group 
action . . . .”); Id. at 12 (citing Case G) (same). 
 168. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-
36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“[N]one of her coworkers 
responded.”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-10882, at 3 
(Div. of Advice Sept. 19 2011)) (“[N]one of his coworkers responded to the 
postings with similar concerns.”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-
CA-22936, at 4–5 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“[N]one of his coworkers 
responded to his complaints about work-related matters.”); Id. at 5 (citing Case 
A) (“[C]oworkers and former coworkers responded.”); Id. at 22 (citing Case C) 
(“The Charging Party’s Facebook post sparked a collective dialogue that elicited 
responses from three of her coworkers . . . .”).  
 169. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-
36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (“The Charging Party did not discuss 
her Facebook post with any of her fellow employees . . . .”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, 
Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA- 22936, at 3 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (“The 
Charging Party did not discuss his Facebook posts with any of his fellow 
employees . . . .”). 
 170. See id. at 32 (citing Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., N.L.R.B. No. 05-CA-
36658, at 3 (Div. of Advice Nov. 14, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the 
employee’s intent to express “a personal complaint about something that had 
happened on her shift”); Id. at 35 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 36-CA-
10882, at 4 (Div. of Advice Sept. 19, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the 
employee’s intent to “vent”); Id. at 33 (citing Buel, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 11-CA-
22936, at 4 (Div. of Advice July 28, 2011)) (finding the postings revealed the 
employee’s intent to “express[] his own frustration and boredom while stranded 
by the weather”); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (finding the postings revealed the 
employee’s intent to express “an individual gripe”); Id. at 12 (citing Case G) 
(finding the postings revealed the employee’s intent to “express[] her personal 
anger with coworkers and the Employer”). 
 171. See id. at 29 (citing Case E) (“[F]ellow employees posted many messages 
of support for the Charging Party’s statements and general encouragement for 
his activity on his Facebook page . . . .”); Id. at 7 (citing Case F) (“Although one 
of her coworkers offered her sympathy and indicated some general 
dissatisfaction with her job, [the coworker] did not engage in any extended 
discussion with the Charging Party over working conditions or indicate any 
interest in taking action with the Charging Party.”). 
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by the First Report: whether the firing that resulted from the 
employee’s Facebook activity constituted a “pre-emptive” strike. 
In other words, sometimes Facebook activity itself does not 
quite rise to the level of concerted activity or is concerted only in 
a preliminary sense. Nevertheless, the Division of Advice 
indicated that it would consider the activity concerted under the 
Act if it represented a movement towards concerted activity that 
could never occur because of the firing. For example, when 
explaining the Division of Advice’s findings in Case C, the 
Acting General Counsel stated:  
While the concerted actions expressed in the posts were of a 
preliminary nature, we concluded that the movement toward 
concerted action was halted by the Employer’s pre-emptive 
discharge and discipline of all the employees involved in the 
Facebook posts. Thus, we concluded that the Employer 
unlawfully prevented the fruition of the employees’ protected 
concerted activity.172 
This “pre-emptive strike” concept relates closely to the second 
factor identified in Part III.A.3: whether the posting 
contemplated future non-Facebook group activity. The language, 
however, is unique to the Second Report and the cases contained 
therein, indicating that perhaps the concept is slightly different. 
C. The ALJ Cases 
1. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. 
Until September 2011, an ALJ did not have occasion to apply 
the Meyers I standard in a case involving a Facebook firing.173 
Other than the First NLRB Report and the Advice Memoranda 
summarized therein, little guidance existed on how the standard 
                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 22 (citing Case C); see also id. at 20 (citing Case B) (“We therefore 
concluded that Charging Party was discharged . . . as a ‘pre-emptive strike’ 
because of the Employer’s fear of what those discussions might lead to.”). 
 173. One reason was choice—the NLRB did not begin issuing Facebook 
firing complaints until October 2010. See Complaint & Notice of Hearing, Am. 
Med. Response of Conn., Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12576 (Region 34 Oct. 27, 
2010) (first Facebook firing complaint). Another reason was opportunity—many 
Facebook firing cases settled prior to adjudication. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
supra note 40, at 5. 
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would apply in the social media context.174 This changed when an 
ALJ issued the first decision of its kind in Hispanics United. 
Hispanics United held that employees’ Facebook postings 
constituted protected concerted activity, making their 
termination unlawful under the NLRA.175 Hispanics United of 
Buffalo, Inc. (HUB) employed Lydia Cruz-Moore as a domestic 
violence social worker.176 Cruz-Moore was often critical of other 
HUB employees’ job performance and communicated this 
criticism through text messages and in-person conversations.177 
In particular, she told one HUB employee, Mariana Cole-Rivera, 
of her plans to raise her concerns with HUB’s Executive Director, 
Lourdes Iglesias.178 Following this conversation, Cole-Rivera 
posted a message on her Facebook page: “‘Lydia Cruz, a coworker 
feels that we don’t help our clients enough at HUB I about had it! 
My fellow coworkers how do u feel?’”179 Several HUB employees 
responded by posting comments.180 After Cruz-Moore complained 
to Iglesias about the Facebook activity, he met individually with 
five of the employees involved in the Facebook activity and fired 
each of them.181 
The ALJ—faced with the issue of whether the HUB 
employees’ Facebook postings constituted protected concerted 
activity—applied the standard of Meyers I and its progeny.182 The 
ALJ asserted that the employees “were taking a first step 
towards taking group action to defend themselves against the 
accusations they could reasonably believe Cruz-Moore was going 
to make to management.”183 Thus, the Facebook postings 
                                                                                                     
 174. The Acting General Counsel did not issue the Second Report until after 
the three ALJ cases discussed in this Note had been decided.  
 175. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 7–9, 
2011 WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). The case is on appeal before 
the five-member board. 
 176. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 4. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 4–6. Cole-Rivera responded to some of the comments. Id. at 5–6. 
In addition, Cruz-Moore posted: “Marianna stop with ur lies about me I’ll b at 
HUB Tuesday.” Id. at 6.     
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 7–8. 
 183. Id. at 8–9. 
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constituted concerted activity.184 Because the ALJ found that the 
other elements of a Section 8 violation were present, he asserted 
that HUB had terminated its employees in violation of the Act.185 
Although the Board asserted in Meyers I that whether an 
activity is concerted is a separate inquiry from whether an 
activity is protected,186 the ALJ in Hispanics United fused both 
inquiries together and reversed the analysis. The ALJ first 
determined that the activity was protected, and then he 
determined that the activity was concerted.187 As a consequence, 
the ALJ did not provide a thorough rationale for his 
determination that the Facebook postings constituted concerted 
activity. Interestingly, the ALJ did not address the unique 
context in which the activity arose, likely because HUB 
“concede[d] that regardless of whether the comments and actions 
of the five terminated employees took place on Facebook or 
‘around the water cooler’ the result would be the same.”188 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id. Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of Advice issued a 
memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint. The Division of 
Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First Report, found the 
that the activity involved was concerted: “[T]he Facebook discussion here was a 
textbook example of concerted activity, even though it transpired on a social 
network platform.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 4. 
 185. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 10, 2011 
WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). First, the ALJ determined that HUB 
knew of the concerted nature of employees’ activity. See id. at 9 (“[T]he fact that 
[HUB] lumped the discriminates together in terminating them, establishes that 
[HUB] viewed the five as a group and that their activity was concerted.”). 
Second, the ALJ determined that the activity was protected. See id. at 8 (“I 
conclude that their Facebook communications with each other, in reaction to a 
co-worker’s criticisms of the manner in which HUB employees performed their 
jobs, are protected.”). Finally, the ALJ noted HUB’s concession that the 
Facebook postings motivated the firings. Id. 
 186. See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (“Once an activity is found to 
be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in addition, . . . the concerted 
activity was protected by the Act . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 187. This is problematic because whether an activity is concerted concerns 
the character of the activity, while whether an activity is protected concerns the 
content of the activity. 
 188. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 8. It is unclear why 
HUB made this concession. 
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2. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. 
A few weeks after the Hispanics United decision, another 
ALJ issued the second Facebook firing decision. Karl Knauz 
Motors held that an employee’s Facebook posting on one topic 
constituted protected concerted activity,189 while the employee’s 
posting on a different topic did not constitute protected concerted 
activity.190 Because the ALJ determined that the latter posting 
caused the employee’s termination, the ALJ found that the 
discharge did not violate the NLRA.191 
The dispute involved Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. (Karl Knauz) 
and its employee, Robert Becker, a car salesman at its BMW 
dealership.192 The dealership was organizing an “Ultimate 
Driving Event” at which it planned to introduce a redesigned 
BMW 5 Series automobile.193 Prior to the event, Becker’s 
supervisor, Phillip Ceraulo, held a meeting at which he informed 
the salespeople of the dealership’s plan to have a hot dog cart at 
the event.194 Both during and after the meeting, Becker and other 
salespeople allegedly commented on the disconnect between the 
hot dog cart and BMW’s status as a luxury brand and the effect 
that the disconnect could have on their commissions.195 While at 
the event, Becker took pictures of the food, including pictures of 
salespeople holding hot dogs.196 He later posted those pictures 
with descriptions on his Facebook page, and some of Becker’s 
Facebook friends posted comments, to which Becker responded.197 
Several days after the event, an accident occurred at a Land 
Rover dealership, also owned by Karl Knauz, that was located 
adjacent to the BMW dealership.198 Becker took pictures of the 
accident and posted pictures, along with comments, on his 
                                                                                                     
 189. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL 
4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011).  
 190. Id. at 9. 
 191. Id. The case is on appeal before the five-member board. 
 192. Id. at 1–2. 
 193. Id. at 2. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. at 3–4. 
 198. See id. at 3 (describing the accident). 
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Facebook page.199 Some of Becker’s Facebook friends, including 
other Karl Knauz employees, posted comments, to which Becker 
responded.200 After Karl Knauz discovered the postings of the 
event and the accident, it terminated Becker’s employment.201 
Thus, the ALJ had to determine whether Becker’s Facebook 
postings of (1) the Ultimate Driving Event (event posting), or 
(2) the accident at the Land Rover dealership (accident posting), 
or (3) both constituted protected concerted activity, making 
Becker’s termination unlawful under the NLRA.202 In applying 
the standard of Meyers I and its progeny, the ALJ found that 
Becker’s event posting constituted concerted activity: 
As both Larsen [another salesperson] and Becker spoke up at 
the meeting commenting on what they considered to be the 
inadequacies of the food being offered at the event, and the 
subject was further discussed by the salespersons after the 
meeting, even though only Becker complained further about it 
on his Facebook pages without any further input from any 
other salesperson, other than the Facebook pictures of [two 
other salespeople], I find that it was concerted 
activities . . . .203 
Because Becker’s individual action was a “‘logical outgrowth of 
prior concerted activity,’”204 his individual action was concerted.  
In contrast, the ALJ found that Becker’s accident posting did 
not constitute concerted activity.205 Supporting his conclusion, the 
ALJ emphasized that “[i]t was posted solely by Becker, 
                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 4. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 5–6  
 202. Id. at 7. 
 203. Id. at 8. In addition, the ALJ determined that the activity was 
protected. See id. (“[I]t was protected . . . as it could have had an effect upon 
[Becker’s] compensation.”). Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of 
Advice issued a memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint. 
The Division of Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First 
Report, found that the activity involved was concerted: “The Facebook activity 
was a direct outgrowth of the earlier discussion among the salespeople that 
followed the meeting with management.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 
8. 
 204. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL 
4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 205. Id. at 9. 
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apparently as a lark, without any discussion with any other 
employee.”206 Because the ALJ found that Becker’s accident 
posting, rather than his event posting, motivated his discharge, 
the ALJ found that Karl Knauz did not terminate Becker in 
violation of Section 8 of the Act.207 
3. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille  
The first ALJ Facebook firing decision of 2012—the third 
decision overall—was issued on January 3, 2012. Triple Play held 
that two employees engaged in concerted activity when they 
responded to a Facebook posting by a former coworker about their 
employer’s tax withholding practices.208 Triple Play Sports Bar 
and Grille (Triple Play) employed Jillian Sanzone as a waitress 
and bartender and Vincent Spinella as a cook.209 When Sanzone 
filed her tax returns, she realized that she owed taxes to the 
state.210 She talked about the tax issue with coworkers, and her 
supervisors arranged a staff meeting to discuss the issue.211 
Before the staff meeting took place, a former employee of 
Triple Play made the following Facebook posting: “Maybe 
someone should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it 
from them. They can’t even do the tax paperwork correctly!!! Now 
I OWE money . . . Wtf!!!!”212 The posting received a number of 
responses from customers and former coworkers, including 
Sanzone.213 In addition, the former employee who made the 
original posting replied to some of the responses.214 After eleven 
responses had been made to the original posting, all expressing 
frustration with owing taxes, Sanzone stated: “I owe too. Such an 
                                                                                                     
 206. Id. In addition, the ALJ determined that the activity was not protected. 
See id. (“It is so obviously unprotected . . . .”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8–9, 
2012 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). The case is on appeal before the 
five-member board. 
 209. Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 2. 
 210. Id. at 3. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 3–4. 
 214. Id. 
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asshole.”215 Although Spinella did not respond with a textual 
comment, he clicked the “Like” button under the initial posting.216 
After two supervisors learned of the Facebook posting and the 
responses, they fired both Sanzone and Spinella.217  
Consequently, the ALJ had to determine whether the two 
employees’ Facebook postings constituted protected concerted 
activity, making their termination unlawful under the NLRA.218 
In answering this question, the ALJ focused on the fact that the 
Facebook postings were “part of an ongoing sequence of events” 
involving the tax issue.219 Employees of Triple Play had discussed 
the matter before the Facebook activity,220 and a meeting was 
scheduled to discuss the matter in the near future.221 In addition, 
the ALJ notably asserted: “The specific medium in which the 
discussion takes place is irrelevant to its protected nature.”222 
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the Facebook activity 
constituted concerted activity.223 
                                                                                                     
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 4. After clicking “Like,” the text “Vincent VinnyCenz Spinella and 
Chelsea Molloy like this” appeared automatically below the original posting. Id. 
Spinella testified that he clicked “Like” after the fifth response had been made, 
a comment by the person who made the original posting: “It’s all Ralph’s [one of 
the supervisor’s] fault. He didn’t do the paperwork right. I’m calling the labor 
board to look into it because he still owes me about 2000 in paychecks.” Id. 
 217. Id. at 4–5. 
 218. Id. at 8–9. 
 219. Id. at 8. 
 220. Id. Thus, the Facebook activity was a “logical outgrowth” of prior 
concerted activity. See id. (“[T]he Facebook discussion was part of a sequence of 
events, including other, face-to-face employee conversations . . . .”). 
 221. Id. Thus, the Facebook activity related to the preparation of group 
action. See id. (“The employees who posted comments . . . specifically discussed 
the issues they intended to raise at [the] upcoming meeting and avenues for 
possible complaints to government entities.”). 
 222. Id. The ALJ’s use of the phrase “protected nature” appears to 
encompass both whether the activity is protected and whether the activity is 
concerted. 
 223. Id. Before progressing to the ALJ stage, the Division of Advice issued a 
memorandum, advising the regional office to issue a complaint. The Division of 
Advice, as noted by the Acting General Counsel in the First Report, found the 
that the activity involved was concerted: “[T]he conversation that transpired on 
Facebook not only embodied ‘truly group complaints’ but also contemplated 
future group activity.” FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45, at 10. 
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Perhaps the most interesting part of the ALJ’s discussion 
came when she discussed the implications of Spinella clicking 
“Like,” rather than responding in text form. The ALJ stated that 
clicking the “Like” button “constituted participation in the 
discussion that was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level 
of concerted activity.”224 Because the ALJ determined that the 
other elements of a Section 8 violation were present and that the 
Facebook activity did not lose the protection of the Act, she found 
that Triple Play had terminated both employees in violation of 
the Act.225 
4. What the ALJ Cases Tell Us 
In deciding the previous three cases, the ALJs considered 
some of the same factors that the Acting General Counsel and 
Division of Advice considered in the two reports and the Advice 
Memoranda cited therein. For example, the ALJs in both Triple 
Play and Karl Knauz Motors afforded weight to the fact that the 
postings grew out of prior non-Facebook activity—factor one.226 In 
addition, the ALJs in both Triple Play and Hispanics United 
found that the postings contemplated future non-Facebook 
activity—factor two.227 
                                                                                                     
 224. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8–9, 
2012 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). The ALJ emphasized that “the 
Board has never parsed the participation of individual employees in otherwise 
concerted conversations, or deemed the protections of Section 7 to be contingent 
upon their level of engagement or enthusiasm.” Id. at 9. 
 225. Id. at 22. In addition to finding that the activity was concerted, the ALJ 
determined that the activity was protected. See id. 8 (“It is beyond question that 
issues related to wages, including the tax treatment of earnings, are directly 
related to the employment relationship and may form the basis for protected 
concerted activity . . . .”). The ALJ also found that Triple Play knew that its 
employees were engaged in protected concerted activity and that Facebook 
activity motivated the firings. Id. at 14–15. 
 226. See id. at 8 (discussing the in-person conversations between employees 
that had taken place before the Facebook posting); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 
N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8, 2011 WL 4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 
2011) (same). 
 227. See Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8 (“The employees who 
posted comments . . . specifically discussed the issues they intended to raise at 
[an] upcoming meeting . . . .”); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-
CA-27872, at 9, 2011 WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011) (finding the 
employees’ postings represented “a first step towards taking group action to 
1748 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2012) 
Furthermore, at least implicitly, the ALJs focused on the 
intent of those involved—factors four and five. For example, in 
Hispanics United, the ALJ indicated that the original poster and 
the coworkers who responded intended “to defend themselves 
against . . . accusations.”228 The Hispanics United decision 
suggests that if the intent of an employee who makes a Facebook 
posting aligns with the intent of the coworkers who respond, the 
Facebook activity is likely concerted. In both Triple Play and Karl 
Knauz Motors—cases that presented different factual 
circumstances than Hispanics United229—the ALJs focused on the 
intent of the parties to continue a discussion that had begun 
previously or to prepare for a future discussion that was planned 
before the commencement of the Facebook activity.230 
The ALJs, however, did not afford nearly as much 
significance to two of the factors identified in Part III.A.3—
factors three and four. Although the ALJs in all three cases 
mentioned whether coworkers responded to the initial posting, 
they did not emphasize coworker responses as essential to their 
analysis. In fact, in Karl Knauz Motors, the ALJ found that the 
posting to which coworkers did respond—the accident posting—
was not concerted,231 while the posting to which coworkers did not 
respond—the event posting—was concerted.232 Moreover, none of 
                                                                                                     
defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe [their 
coworker] was going to make to management”). 
 228. Hispanics United, N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 8–9. 
 229. In Triple Play, the person who made the original posting was not a 
current employee of the company charged with an unfair labor practice, but a 
former one. Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 3. In Karl Knauz Motors, 
the posting that the ALJ found was concerted received no coworker responses. 
Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 8. 
 230. See Triple Play, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 8 (finding that the 
employees’ responses to the original posting indicated an intent to “discuss[] the 
issues they intended to raise at [the] upcoming meeting and avenues for possible 
complaints to government entitles”); Karl Knauz, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 
8 (finding that the event posting reflected an intent to continue expressing 
complaints about management’s choice of food expressed previously at a 
meeting). 
 231. See Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 3 (stating that 
multiple coworkers responded to the accident posting).  
 232. See id. at 7 (“[E]ven though only Becker complained further about it on 
his Facebook pages without any further input from any other salesperson . . . I 
find that it was concerted . . . .”). 
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the ALJs considered whether the person who made the original 
posting discussed the posting itself with coworkers.   
Finally, although the ALJs did not use the “pre-emptive 
strike” terminology that the Division of Advice employed,233 the 
ALJ in Hispanics United invoked the concept by stating: “By 
discharging the discriminatees . . . [the employer] prevented them 
[from] taking any further group action.” 234 
IV. Why the Concerted Activity Standard Is Problematic in the 
Social Media Context  
Many have accused the Board of playing politics, arguing 
that the Board’s decision to enter into the social media realm is 
part of a larger pro-union effort to expand its role.235 Still, others 
have argued that the Board’s role in enforcing the NLRA has 
never been more important, given the decline in union 
membership that has occurred over the past few decades.236 
Politics aside, however, there are problems with the way that the 
Board has applied the traditional concerted activity standard in 
the emerging context of social media. 
A. Where the Board Draws the Line 
The root of the difficulty in applying the standard is the same 
in the social media context as it is in other contexts: determining 
                                                                                                     
 233. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 234. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 3-CA-27872, at 9, 2011 
WL 3894520 (Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). 
 235. See Dave Jamieson, Wilma Liebman, Outgoing NLRB Chair, Finds 
‘Silver Lining’ in Political Rancor, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2011, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/05/wilma-liebman-nlrb-chairwoman-
interview_n_947258.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“Corporations and their 
allies have decried the board as ‘out of control’ during Liebman’s tenure as 
chairwoman.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Those who 
argue that the Board is “out of control” point to other recent Board actions, in 
conjunction with those related to social media. Id.  
 236. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First 
Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 
(2002) (“As union representation continues to decline, particularly in the private 
sector, a broad interpretation and application of section 7 in the nonunion 
workplace is even more important today than it was ten or twenty years ago.”). 
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the point at which individual activity transforms into concerted 
activity. As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. City Disposal 
Systems, Inc.,237 challenging issues often arise concerning “the 
precise manner in which particular actions of an individual 
employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees”238 in 
order for the individual action to be concerted. On the one hand, 
if the Board interprets and applies the Meyers I standard too 
broadly, the standard will lose all meaning. On the other hand, if 
the Board interprets and applies the standard too narrowly, the 
Board will fail to effectuate the Act’s purposes. To avoid these 
undesirable alternatives, the Board has attempted to draw a line 
between individually initiated activity that is concerted and that 
which is not.  
In drawing this line, the Board distinguishes between 
situations in which an individual acts with the “intent[] to enlist 
the support of other employees in a common endeavor”239 and 
situations in which that intent is lacking.240 In Mushroom 
Transportation Co.,241 an oft-cited opinion, the Third Circuit 
explained that “a conversation may constitute concerted activity 
although it involves only a speaker and a listener.”242 However, 
this speaker-listener concept has limits: 
Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be 
protected, be talk looking toward group action. If its only 
purpose is to advise an individual as to what he could or 
should do without involving fellow workers or union 
representation to protect or improve his own status or working 
position, it is an individual, not a concerted activity, and, if it 
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be 
mere “griping.”243 
Thus, “mere griping” is the antithesis of concerted activity and is 
not protected by the Act.244 The Board has used this concerted 
                                                                                                     
 237. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). 
 238. Id. at 831. 
 239. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 888 (1986). 
 240. See id. at 885 (stating that “an employee’s activities engaged in ‘solely 
by and on behalf of the employee himself,’” do not constitute concerted activity). 
 241. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 242. Id. at 685. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the 
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activity–mere griping dichotomy to guide its analysis of Facebook 
firing cases. In a press release accompanying the Second Report, 
the Board emphasized: “An employee’s comments on social media 
are generally not protected if they are mere gripes not made in 
relation to group activity among employees.”245  
B. Why the Board’s Line Drawing Is Problematic 
Stating that “mere griping” does not constitute concerted 
activity is nothing new.246 The social media forum, however, 
presents new challenges to those attempting to distinguish 
between concerted activity and mere griping. First, social media 
is, as its name suggests, social. Because it necessarily involves 
interaction to varying degrees, almost any individual action in a 
social media forum could be considered concerted.247 Therefore, in 
cases involving social media, it is easier to establish the “linkage 
to group action”248 that the Board requires. After all, employees 
are often Facebook friends with coworkers. If an employee makes 
a Facebook posting, coworkers can read the posting without 
responding, “Like” the posting, or respond in text form. If 
                                                                                                     
Requirement of Concert Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 286, 290 (1981) (“[W]hen an individual employee protests alone, without 
any consultation with and authorization by fellow employees, his legal rights 
under section 7 may be drastically curtailed, even when he purports to voice the 
concerns of others but especially when he is speaking only for himself . . . .”). 
 245. Press Release, NLRB, Acting General Counsel Issues Second Social 
Media Report (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-
issues-second-social-media-report (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 246. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 244, at 290 (“The prevailing principle 
of law—endorsed both by the courts of appeals and the NLRB—is that section 7 
does not protect ‘personal gripes’ by individual employees.”).  
 247. See John Hyman, Is the NLRB Backing Off Its Position on Social Media 
as Protected, Concerted Activity?, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES: LABOR & 
EMPLOYMENT COMMUNITY (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
community/labor-employment-law/blogs/labor-employment-commentary/archive/ 
2012/01/10/is-the-nlrb-backing-off-its-position-on-social-media-as-protected-con 
certed-activity.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“One of my key concerns about 
the NLRB’s foray into regulating workplace social media is that, by its very 
nature, social media is concerted . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 248. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 884 (1986). 
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concerted activity need only involve “a speaker and a listener”249 
and an intent on the speaker’s part to initiate group action, it 
becomes difficult to imagine when Facebook activity concerning 
working conditions would not fit within the current definition of 
concerted activity. This is especially true given that the Board 
has indicated neither the degree of linkage to group action that it 
requires, nor how it determines employee intent, in the social 
media context. 
At the same time, social media lends itself to griping. As 
anyone with a Facebook page knows, many Facebook users 
employ their page as a platform to air personal complaints—both 
work-related and otherwise. Facebook friends can respond to 
such complaints—offering sympathy or humor—with informality 
and ease. Consequently, Facebook does not fit into the present 
concerted activity standard easily because the forum is inherently 
concerted, yet it fosters activity that is the opposite of concerted: 
griping.  
V. Possible Approaches 
When thinking about how the Board can increase certainty 
in this area of law, it is important to be realistic. First, the NLRA 
is likely here to stay.250 Second, it is unlikely that the Board will 
completely re-construe Section 7 of the Act.251 Its current 
                                                                                                     
 249. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 250. See Corbett, supra note 236, at 264 (“While there may be a need to 
substantially overhaul the body of law regulating the employment relationship 
in the United States, it is doubtful that such a project will be undertaken by 
lawmakers absent an economic catastrophe.”). One could argue that the United 
States has experienced an economic catastrophe in the past few years. However, 
lawmakers’ response to the current economic crisis will likely be different from 
lawmakers’ response to the Great Depression—out of which the NLRA was 
born—because of the recent political controversies surrounding the Board’s use 
of power. Instead of overhauling the NLRA completely, lawmakers will likely 
continue the trend of enacting more individual employment rights laws, if they 
legislate in this area at all. Id.  
 251. Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law 
Protection for Concerted Communication on Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 29, 33 (2011) (“At the moment, it seems as though the current NLRB is 
poised to adapt existing legal doctrines to craft new rules and remedies 
regarding employer rules and restrictions concerning employee use of . . . social 
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construction of the Section, as reflected by the Meyers I standard, 
endured a challenge by the D.C. Circuit252 and has remained for 
over twenty-five years. Consequently, the three approaches that I 
suggest all work within the Board’s current framework.  
A. Addressing the Problem at the Front-End 
In addition to resolving the concerted activity issue in 
Facebook firing cases, the Board often determines the legality of 
employers’ social media policies and other rules in employers’ 
handbooks.253 As the Board stated in Lafayette Park Hotel,254 if an 
employer maintains rules that “are likely to have a chilling effect 
on Section 7 rights, the Board may conclude that their 
maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of 
enforcement.”255 To determine whether a rule has an 
impermissible chilling effect, the Board examines whether 
“(1) employees would reasonably construe the language [of the 
rule] to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated 
in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to 
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”256  
The ALJs in both Triple Play and Karl Knauz Motors 
examined employer rules in light of the above factors. In Triple 
Play, the ALJ analyzed the employer’s social media policy and 
concluded that the policy did not violate the Act.257 In contrast, 
the ALJ in Karl Knauz Motors found that rules in the employer’s 
handbook did violate the Act.258 Interestingly, the ALJ addressed 
                                                                                                     
media sites.”). 
 252. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 253. See, e.g., Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 
20–22, 2011 WL 76862 (Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012) (analyzing the employer’s 
social media policy); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 9–
11, 2011 WL 4499437 (Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011) (analyzing provisions in 
the employer’s handbook). 
 254. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998). 
 255. Id. at 825. 
 256. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004). This 
inquiry is appropriate when a “rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected 
by Section 7.” Id. If a rule restricts Section 7 activity explicitly, the Board will 
find a violation of the Act without further inquiry. Id. at 646. 
 257. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, N.L.R.B. No. 34-CA-12915, at 22. 
 258. Karl Knauz Motors, N.L.R.B. No. 13-CA-46452, at 11. The ALJ found 
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the lawfulness of the rules even after finding that the employer 
did not discharge the employee because of the event posting—the 
posting that the ALJ found constituted protected concerted 
activity.259  
One approach that the Board could take is to promulgate a 
model social media policy through its rulemaking process.260 
Ideally, the promulgation of a model policy would lead to less 
Facebook firing complaints and subsequent adjudication because 
it would increase certainty for both employers and employees. 
When an employer became aware of employee Facebook activity 
that concerned the employer, he or she could analyze the activity 
in terms of how it fit within the contours of the model policy. The 
employer could then take action, or refrain from taking action, 
based on his or her determination of whether the employee 
activity violated the model policy. Because the employer’s 
determination would be based on a lawful model policy that 
would guide the employer’s decisionmaking, less adjudication of 
the lawfulness of employee discipline or discharge would likely 
result. The promulgation of a model policy would also benefit 
employees by informing their judgment when they use social 
media. 
This approach would address the concerted activity problem 
at the front-end. The model policy would be preventative, in that 
it would hopefully lead to fewer unfair labor practice disputes in 
the first place. As a consequence, the Board would be called on 
less often to construe the concerted activity provision of 
Section 7 in the social media context.  
                                                                                                     
the following rules unlawful: (1) a rule prohibiting employees from “be[ing] 
disrespectful or use[ing] profanity or any other language which injures the 
reputation of the dealership” and (2) rules “prohibit[ing] employees from 
participating in interviews with, or answering inquiries concerning employees 
from, practically anybody.” Id. at 9. 
 259. Id. at 9 (finding that the accident posting, which did not constitute 
protected concerted activity, caused the discharge). Moreover, the ALJ 
addressed the rules even though the employer rescinded them voluntarily prior 
to the hearing. Id. at 11. 
 260. In its Third Report, the Board analyzed seven social media policies. 
THIRD NLRB REPORT, supra note 53. Perhaps the NLRB could use the one policy 
that it deemed lawful in its entirety as a starting point to formulate a model 
policy. See id. at 19–24 (explaining why the policy was lawful and providing a 
copy of the policy). 
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This approach is not without problems, however. First, the 
model policy would not eliminate disputes altogether because 
employers and employees could misinterpret or misapply the 
policy, and the Board would have to resolve those disputes. 
Second, the Board tends to favor adjudication over 
rulemaking,261 a preference that has a persuasive rationale in 
certain circumstances.262 Finally, given the controversy 
surrounding the Board’s recent actions,263 the Board may not be 
willing to risk the possibility of more backlash that may result 
from a visible use of power. 
B. Addressing the Problem Head-On 
Most likely, the Board will continue to address the problem 
head-on, by attempting to clarify through adjudication how the 
Act’s concerted activity provision—as interpreted by the Board in 
Meyers I and Meyers II—applies in cases involving social media. 
The Board’s present attempts at clarification, however, have not 
provided the guidance that employers and employees need. While 
the Board provided details of social media cases in its reports,264 
it neither identified nor explained the commonalities among the 
cases that it found significant. Likewise, the Board did not 
distinguish the cases from each other to show how the presence 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in 
Administrative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and 
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2017 (2009) (stating that the Board 
“eschews notice-and-comment rulemaking”). However, the Board has engaged in 
rulemaking recently. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Adopts Rules to 
Speed Unionization Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at B5 (describing new rules 
adopted by the NLRB that “speed up unionization elections”). 
 262. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (stating that an “agency may 
not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant 
rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.”). 
 263. See Kathleen Furey McDonough, Labor: Political Controversy 
Surrounds the NLRB, INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.inside 
counsel.com/2012/01/09/labor-political-controversy-surrounds-the-nlrb (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“In a political environment mired in controversy, the 
National Labor Relations Board . . . is one of the federal agencies receiving more 
than the usual dose of criticism.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 264. See FIRST NLRB REPORT, supra note 45; SECOND NLRB REPORT, supra 
note 46. 
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or absence of a certain fact affected its analysis of concerted 
activity. 
Because the evaluation of Facebook firing cases is fact-
specific,265 identifying factors unique to the social media context 
that tend to indicate concertedness, or lack thereof, could help 
remedy the uncertainty. This Note identifies factors that the 
Board seemed to consider significant to its analysis of concerted 
activity in Facebook firing cases.266 A similar identification of 
factors by the Board could help organize and guide the Board’s 
analysis in future cases and provide clarity for both employers 
and employees. 
C. Addressing the Problem at the Back-End 
Even if the Board finds that an employee’s Facebook activity 
constitutes protected concerted activity, the employee may 
nevertheless lose the protection of the Act under one of the 
Board’s several loss-of-protection standards. For example, in 
Atlantic Steel Co.,267 the Board asserted: “[E]ven an employee 
who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by 
opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.”268 Moreover, 
statements that constitute protected concerted activity but are 
disloyal can lose the protection of the Act if “they are made ‘at a 
critical time in the initiation of the company’s’ business 
and . . . constitute ‘a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the 
quality of the company’s product and its business policies, in a 
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation 
and reduce its income.’”269  
                                                                                                     
 265. See Melanie Trottman, For Angry Employees, Legal Cover for Rants, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702037 
10704577049822809710332.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting the 
Board’s Acting General Counsel who “‘stress[ed] that each of these cases is very 
factual’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 266. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3, and III.C.4. 
 267. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979). 
 268. Id. at 816. “The decision as to whether the employee has crossed that 
line depends on several factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject 
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and 
(4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair 
labor practice.” Id. 
 269. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007) (quoting 
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Perhaps the Board could address the concerted activity 
problem by applying existing loss-of-protection standards more 
strictly to employee activity in the social media context or by 
developing a social media specific loss-of-protection standard. If 
the Board construes the Meyers I standard broadly when 
applying it in cases involving social media,270 it may be 
appropriate for the Board to apply a more stringent loss-of-
protection standard subsequently to ensure that the activity in 
question is activity that Congress intended for the NLRA to 
protect. Social media cases warrant such a stringent application 
because social media alters the mix of employer and employee 
interests involved.271 In addition, the Board’s notice posting 
rule272 will lessen the long-standing concern that many, if not 
most, non-unionized employees are unaware of their rights under 
the NLRA.273 Because the rule alleviates this concern, it is 
reasonable to require employees to conform their actions more 
closely to what the Act requires in order to obtain the Act’s 
protection. 
                                                                                                     
NLRB v. Elec. Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472 
(1953)). 
 270. This broad construction could be intentional or unintentional. As 
explained previously, it is difficult to apply the Meyers I standard in the social 
media context because social media inherently involves some degree of 
interaction yet fosters griping. See supra Part IV.B. 
 271. See O’Brien, supra note 251, at 47 n.83 (“[E]mployee use of social media 
to vent discontent is more likely to extend beyond the workplace and damage a 
company’s reputation than an on-site verbal confrontation.”); Trottman, supra 
note 265 (discussing the reputational concerns that online postings implicate). 
 272. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011). The rule requires “most private-sector 
employers . . . to post a notice advising employees of their rights under the 
National Labor Relations Act.” NLRB, Employee Rights Notice Posting, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 273. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing 
Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 431, 433 (1995) (“American workers are largely ignorant of their rights 
under the NLRA, and this ignorance stands as an obstacle to the effective 
exercise of such rights.”). 
1758 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2012) 
VI. Conclusion 
When introducing the bill that eventually became the NLRA, 
the bill’s sponsor, Senator Robert F. Wagner, stated: “When 
employees are denied the freedom to act in concert even when 
they desire to do so, they cannot exercise a restraining influence 
upon the wayward members of their own groups, and they cannot 
participate in our national endeavor to coordinate production and 
purchasing power.”274 While emphasizing the importance of 
providing employees with an enforceable right to engage in 
concerted activity, Senator Wagner nevertheless acknowledged: 
“[E]mployers are tremendously handicapped when it is 
impossible to determine exactly what their rights are. Everybody 
needs a law that is precise and certain.”275 
The need for precision and certainty is as great today as it 
was then. Precision and certainty in the Act’s application benefits 
both employees and employers and creates confidence in the 
Board. Because the Board’s foray into Facebook firing cases is 
recent, it would be unrealistic to expect the Board to have a 
ready-made solution to the issues that the social media context 
presents. Still, the Board must begin to acknowledge the 
differences that exist between the virtual water cooler and the 
traditional water cooler, and it must devise an approach. This 
Note presents three approaches—approaches that the Board can 
implement individually or in concert—formulated with an 
understanding of the interests involved and the context’s distinct 
attributes. 
                                                                                                     
 274. 79 CONG. REC. 2371, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner). 
 275. Id. The act that preceded the NLRA, the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, conferred on employees similar rights to engage in concerted activities, but 
it did not contain an enforcement mechanism. Id. 
